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Inductive reasoning (IR) requires efficient working memory (WM).  Research 
shows that the prefrontal cortex (PFC) is involved during WM tasks and that PFC 
functioning declines with age.  The ability to comprehend and update text-based 
information requires an intact PFC and efficient WM and IR.  The current study 
presented a series of messages about the investigation of a warehouse fire to 48 young 
and 48 older adults.  One message contained a piece of misinformation which another 
message corrected later.  It was hypothesized that a memory cue to the misinformation 
with the correction statement should benefit older adults the most during the updating 
process.  A text-based level and situation model level measured updating.  The text-based 
level is only information from the text but is not necessarily verbatim.  The situation 
model level is the overall meaning of the text, including inferences and assumptions. 
Results show that unlike young adults, older adults are not capable of recalling the text at 
the text-based level.  However, older adults are capable of performing like young adults 
at the situation model level.  This suggests that older adults are capable of updating 
causal information in text material as long as a memory cue to the misinformation is 
provided within the correction statement. 
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Introduction 
 The ability to update and comprehend text requires the reader to make causal 
inferences.  Determining causal relationships involves working memory executive 
function (Fry & Hale, 1996; Kail, 2007; Waltz et al., 1999).  Research has shown that 
declines in working memory executive function result in declines in comprehension 
(Norman, Kemper, Kynette, Cheung, & Anagnopoulos, 1991; Stine & Wingfield, 1990; 
Tun, Wingfield, & Stine, 1991).  Furthermore, the prefrontal cortex is involved during 
working memory and causal reasoning tasks (Baddeley, 1992; Fugelsang & Dunbar, 
2005; Prabhakaran, Smith, Desmond, Glover, & Gabrieli, 1997).  For example, Monchi, 
Petrides, Petre, Worsley, and Dagher (2001) found that while participants completed the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task, a task sensitive to working memory executive function, 
different areas of the prefrontal cortex were activated. 
 Research has consistently shown age differences on tasks involving the PFC and 
working memory executive function (Haut, Kuwabara, Leach, & Callahan, 2000; Rypma 
& D'Esposito, 2000).  For example, Hartman, Bolton, and Fehnel (2001) showed that 
older adults' decline in working memory functioning led to declines in performance on 
the WCST.  Likewise, declines in working memory functioning influence comprehension 
(Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Norman et al., 1991; Stine & Wingfield, 1990; Tun et al., 
1991).  Comprehending text requires the reader to update working memory with new 
information as it is acquired.  However, prior information can interfere during the 
updating process for young adults (Johnson & Seifert, 1994, 1998, 1999; Seifert & 
Patalano, 2001).  Due to declines in working memory and PFC functioning, older adults 
may have more difficulty than young adults when updating causal information.   
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 Research has shown that memory cues to prior information provide older adults 
with the necessary information to update working memory with new information 
(Hartman et al., 2001; Mutter, Strain, & Plumlee, 2007).  The current study investigated 
whether there are age differences in updating causal information in text and whether 
providing cues to the erroneous causal information reduced these differences.  
Participants read text information that contained a piece of misinformation.  Later, that 
misinformation was corrected and either a direct cue to the prior misinformation or an 
indirect cue to prior information was provided.  Older adults should benefit more than 
young adults from the extra memory support provided from a direct cue to the prior 
misinformation than an indirect cue to prior information.   
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Literature Review 
Reasoning is a process of identifying and integrating multiple relations between 
objects and events in order to make inferences (Waltz et al., 1999).  Inductive reasoning 
involves determining whether events provide grounds for a plausible conclusion (Goel & 
Dolan, 2004).  In other words, induction involves moving from specific instances to a 
generalization (Kinshuk, Lin, & McNab, 2006).  Acquiring causal information and 
making causal inferences requires inductive reasoning because causal cues are used to 
determine the likelihood and plausibility of outcome occurrence.  For example, inductive 
reasoning is involved in the determination of whether smoking is a plausible cause of 
lung cancer.   
The ability to comprehend text also requires inductive reasoning because 
information acquired must be integrated to determine if a conclusion is plausible.  For 
example, if a reader encounters the information that Jack is taller than Bob and Bob is 
taller than Steve, then by integrating this information the reader can reason that Jack is 
taller than Steve.  Revising text information is a form of comprehension referred to as 
"updating" (Rapp & Kendeou, 2007).    This includes the correction of misinformation in 
memory (Johnson & Seifert, 1998), retrieval of prior text information during reading 
(O'Brien, Rizzella, Albrecht, & Halleran, 1998), and the evaluation of new information 
against previous information (Zwaan & Madden, 2004).  Updating processes during 
comprehension of text information involve inductive reasoning because the reader must 
integrate new, possibly contradictory information with prior text to determine whether the 
outcome is plausible.  For example, if the text provides information that Jack received a 
poor grade on his math test, the reader may infer that Jack is a poor student.  However, if 
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the text that follows provides information that Jack normally performs well in his math 
class, but the upcoming school dance has been clouding his thoughts for days, the reader 
may integrate this information with prior information and come to a new conclusion that 
Jack is normally a good student but that social activities are currently a distraction.  
   Performing inductive reasoning and comprehension tasks requires hypothesis 
testing, analogous thinking, generalization and learning transferability, categorization, 
planning, and problem solving (Bransford, Brown, Cocking, Donovan, & Pellegrino, 
2000; Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Thagard, 1987; Heit, 2000; Hulshof, 2001; de Jong 
& van Joolingen, 1998; Delis, Squire, Bihrle, & Massman, 1992; Milner & Petrides, 
1984; Owens, Downes, Sahakian, Polkey, & Robbins, 1990; Shallice & Burgess, 1991).  
All of these cognitive tasks have, in turn, been linked to working memory (WM) 
executive function.  Intact WM functioning is a crucial determinant of success in 
reasoning and comprehension because WM is required to integrate information and to 
maintain the information as inferences are made (Waltz et al., 1999).  In support of this, 
Fry and Hale (1996) and Kail (2007) found that as children’s processing speed and 
working memory increased, their inductive reasoning skills improved.  Furthermore, in a 
study by Buehner, Krumm, Ziegler, and Pluecken (2006), working memory executive 
function was found to predict reasoning after controlling for intelligence in young adults.  
Working memory is also correlated with comprehension (Stine, Cheung, & Henderson, 
1995).  For example, older adults demonstrate a decline in working memory (Van der 
Linden, Beerten, & Pesenti, 1998; Van der Linden, Bredart, & Beerten, 1994) that leads 
to difficulties with comprehension of text (Norman et al., 1991; Stine & Wingfield, 1990; 
Tun et al., 1991).    
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The prefrontal cortex (PFC) has been linked to working memory executive 
processes that maintain appropriate attentional and coordinative functions during 
inductive reasoning tasks.  Baddeley (1992) showed in an fMRI study that the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) is involved in working memory executive 
function.  Likewise, an fMRI study using Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices Test, a 
test commonly used to measure inductive reasoning, revealed activation in multiple brain 
regions, including the DLPFC (Prabhakaran et al., 1997).  Moreover, damage to the PFC 
is associated with poorer performance on inductive reasoning tasks.  In a study by Waltz 
et al. (1999), participants either had damage to the PFC or the anterior temporal cortex.  
Both groups performed Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices Test to assess inductive 
reasoning.  Results revealed a dissociation in that the PFC group was impaired during the 
integration of multiple relations, while the anterior temporal group was able to perform 
this task.  In other words, an intact PFC was essential to successful inductive reasoning.  
Other studies have shown that damage to the PFC results in a decline in performance on 
inductive reasoning tasks (i.e., Shallice & Burgess, 1991; Stuss & Alexander, 2000). 
Increased activity in the DLPFC may also be associated with the generation and 
evaluation of hypotheses (Grafman, 2002).  The Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST), a 
test that involves testing hypotheses about categories is often used to measure both 
deficits in executive function and a decline in frontal lobe function.  Participants are 
asked to match each of the cards in the deck to one of four key category cards.  They are 
not told how to match the cards (color, shape, or form), only whether they are correct or 
not.  The correct category changes once the participant has matched the cards for 10 trials 
in a row.  This forces the participant to inhibit the previous responses and choose another 
 6 
 
category to match the cards.  Monchi et al. (2001) found that depending upon the stage of 
the WCST (receiving positive feedback, receiving negative feedback, reception of 
feedback, and response period), greater activity was found in different prefrontal areas.  
Receiving either positive or negative feedback was associated with increased signal in the 
middorsolateral PFC.  This area is involved in monitoring information in working 
memory (Fugelsang & Dunbar, 2005).  In other words, this area was activated when the 
subject had to relate the current information to earlier events stored in working memory.  
The midventrolateral prefrontal area was involved while receiving negative feedback.  
This area is considered to be more involved in basic executive functioning such as the 
active comparison of stimuli held in working memory.  This differs from the role of the 
middorsolateral PFC because the midventrolateral PFC is involved when the subject 
needs to switch to a new response.  However, the middorsolateral PFC was activated 
regardless of whether a new response was required.  The posterior prefrontal cortex 
showed increased activity during both the reception of feedback and the response period.  
This indicates a role in the association of specific actions to stimuli.   
  Recent research has shown that the PFC is also involved in causal reasoning.  
Fugelsang and Dunbar (2005) examined the degree to which plausible and implausible 
causal theories biased the evaluation of statistical covariation-based causal data and also 
examined the areas of the brain involved in this reasoning process.  Participants received 
information about the effectiveness of drugs relieving depressive symptoms.  Data were 
presented in combination of a cause (a red pill or a blue pill) and an effect (happiness or 
neutral outcome).  Under some conditions, the red pill and happiness covaried strongly, 
while under other conditions the red pill and happiness covaried weakly.  The plausibility 
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of a causal theory was manipulated by presenting participants with a brief introductory 
statement that contained either a direct causal mechanism linking a red pill to a mood 
outcome or no direct causal mechanism linking the pill to a mood outcome.  Fugelsang 
and Dunbar found that both the plausibility of the theory and the covariation between the 
occurrence of the red pill and the outcome influenced the participants’ causal judgments.  
Specifically, the effects of covariation were larger when evaluating a plausible as 
opposed to an implausible causal theory.    Using fMRI, Fugelsang and Dunbar were able 
to demonstrate that bilateral prefrontal regions and the left inferior frontal gyrus were 
significantly more activated when participants processed data during the evaluation of a 
plausible theory as opposed to an implausible theory.  These areas were also active 
during working memory executive function tasks suggesting that their participants were 
devoting more working memory resources to processing covariation data during the 
evaluation of the plausible theory.  Furthermore, different areas of the brain were 
activated depending upon whether the data were consistent versus inconsistent with the 
theory.  Evaluation of data consistent with a plausible causal theory activated the 
parahippocampal gyrus and the caudate, which are associated with learning and memory, 
while evaluation of data inconsistent with a plausible causal theory activated the anterior 
cingulate, the precuneus and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, which are involved in 
error detection and conflict monitoring. 
 Recent research has looked at the PFC's involvement in causal inferences during 
text comprehension.  In an fMRI study, Mason and Just (2004) had participants read two-
sentence passages that varied in their degree of causal relatedness.  Results showed that 
the DLPFC was activated when comprehension required the generation of a causal 
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inference.  This suggests that the PFC plays an important role during sentence 
comprehension.   
Aging, Reasoning, and Comprehension 
Older adults’ performance on tasks involving the PFC and working memory 
executive function (i.e. Reading Span, Backward Digit Span, and Computation Span) is 
consistently poorer than younger adults’ performance. In a study by Rypma and 
D’Esposito (2000), PFC activity was observed through fMRI during the encoding, 
maintenance, and retrieval stages of working memory.  Results showed age-related 
differences in dorsolateral PFC only during retrieval of information.  Furthermore, the 
inability to retrieve information was associatated with increases in cortical activity in the 
dorsolateral PFC for young adults but was associated with decreases in cortical activity in 
the dorsolateral PFC for older adults.  Further evidence that age differences in 
performance on working memory tasks is a result of differences in the activity level of 
the PFC comes from a study by Haut et al. (2000).  In this study, PET was used to assess 
age-related differences in brain activity during two verbal working memory tasks.  One 
working memory task was a self-ordering task where young participants were asked to 
say the numbers 1-10 in a different order on each trial.  The other working memory task 
was externally ordered where the young participants listened to numbers from 1-10 in a 
random order.  One number would be left out and the participant was required to say the 
missing number.  To enable older participants to perform at the same level, numbers 1-6 
were used on the two working memory tasks.  The results demonstrated that both groups 
had activation in the anterior cingulate gyrus and the dorsolateral PFC.  However, young 
participants had increased activation in the right dorsolateral PFC during the self-ordering 
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task and the right anterior cingulate gyrus on the externally ordered task, while older 
adults had greater activation in the left prefrontal cortex on the externally ordered task.   
Neuroanatomical explanations maintain that the WCST is sensitive to dysfunction 
of the prefrontal cortex (Mountain & Snow, 1993) and that changes in this part of the 
brain account for the poor performance of older adults (Hartman et al., 2001; Raz, 
Gunning-Dixon, Head, Dupuis, & Acker, 1998).  Consistent with this explanation, Raz et 
al. (1998) have shown that shrinkage of the prefrontal cortex in older adults produces 
age-related perseverations on the WCST. For example, older adults display more 
perseverations (Axelrod & Henry, 1992; Daigneault, Braun, & Whitaker, 1992; Heaton, 
Chelune, Talley, Kay, & Curtis, 1993) and complete fewer categories than young adults 
on the WCST (Axelrod & Henry, 1992; Beatty, 1993; Daigtneault et al., 1992; Fristoe, 
Salthouse, & Woodard, 1997; Parkin & Walter, 1991).  Hartman et al. (2001) 
manipulated the demands of working memory on the WCST by varying the amount of 
processing needed to select a rule and the amount of stored information required for 
selecting the correct rule.  When a new rule has to be selected, more processing is 
needed.  Therefore, errors that followed an incorrect sort were a high processing load and 
errors that followed a correct sort were a low processing load.  The other variable that 
determined working memory demands was the amount of information needed to 
determine how to sort each card (i.e. memory load).  Errors had either high or low 
memory load depending upon whether the preceding sort contained enough information 
to select the correct rule.  For example, if trial n-1 consisted of a correct sort and the key 
card could only be matched correctly on one dimension, trial n was considered a low 
memory load.  However, if trial n-1 consisted of a correct sort and the key card could be 
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matched on more than one dimension, then the error on trial n occurred under high 
memory load conditions.  Memory loads for incorrect sorts were determined under the 
same conditions.  Results showed that low performance older adults demonstrated a 
deficit in working memory and a decline in performance on the WCST.  This reduced 
working memory may represent a deficit in the ability to update the contents of working 
memory due to problems during encoding and integrating relevant information from 
completed sorts into working memory.  In a second experiment, Hartman et al. tested this 
theory by comparing performance on the original version of the WCST with a modified 
version of the test that consisted of cues to inform participants whether the most recent 
sort was correct or not.  Results showed that the cues improved older adults' performance 
to the level of younger adults' performance on the original version of the WCST. In other 
words, age-related differences in errors on the WCST can be explained by an inability to 
adequately update working memory with new information which hinders older adults' 
ability to remember prior sorts. 
Older adults also experience difficulties on inductive reasoning tasks that may be 
due to PFC decline and working memory executive function impairment.  Raven's 
Progressive Matrices task, a test used to measure inductive reasoning, requires working 
memory executive function because one must combine information to make relations. A 
study by Viskontas, Holyoak, and Knowlton (2005) tested inductive reasoning in young, 
middle-aged, and older participants using the Raven’s Progressive Matrices task.  Results 
showed that older participants had more difficulty in solving the reasoning problems that 
required integrating multiple relations.  In an fMRI study, Prabhakaran et al. (1997) 
found that when participants solved the problems in Raven's Progressive Matrices task, 
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frontal regions were activated.  This suggests that working memory processes are 
involved during reasoning.  
PFC and executive function decline may also provide an explanation for the 
difficulty older adults experience during causal reasoning.  In a simple discrimination 
task, Mutter, Haggbloom, Plumlee, and Schirmer (2006) had young adults, young adults 
with a concurrent working memory load, and older adults determine whether the 
occurrence (feature positive; FP) or the nonoccurrence (feature negative; FN) of a 
distinctive feature predicted reinforcement.  In other words, participants had to determine 
the causal relationship between the presence or absence of the distinctive feature and the 
reinforcement.  Results revealed that initial discrimination was affected by both age and 
WM load.  However, with additional experience, only the FN discrimination was affected 
by age and WM load.  Young adults with reduced WM capacity performed like old 
adults, especially during FN discrimination, suggesting that the more difficult inductive 
reasoning processes places greater demands on WM.  
Comprehension also requires inductive reasoning processes and intact working 
memory (Caplan & Waters, 1999).  Not only must one maintain information in working 
memory while new information is processed, but one must also be able to update 
inferences by incorporating the new information and inhibiting irrelevant information in 
order to integrate meanings to ensure coherence.  Several studies have demonstrated that 
executive function as measured by a working memory span task influences 
comprehension (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Norman et al., 1991; Stine & Wingfield, 
1990; Tun et al., 1991).  Furthermore, considerable research has shown there are age 
differences in the ability to represent textual materials.  There are three levels of 
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representation for text that are required for comprehension.  The surface level consists of 
a representation of the actual words and syntax.  The propositional text-based level 
involves an abstract representation of only information that is in the text but does not 
need to be verbatim like the surface level.  Finally, the situation model is a representation 
of the overall meaning including inferences and assumptions about the events in the text.  
Comprehension requires successful representations of text at all three of these levels, as 
well as the ability to monitor and update new information as it is acquired (Radvansky & 
Curiel, 1998).   
Stine-Morrow, Gagne, and DeWall (2004) demonstrated that there are age 
differences at the surface level.  They had young and old participants read a passage of 
text twice.  Reading times were used to determine the amount of attention participants 
placed on the actual words during the rereading.  If readers are able to represent text at 
the surface level, they should be familiar with the words during the second reading and 
would not need to spend as much time reading each word.  Results showed that older 
adults spent more time on the words during the second reading compared to young adults.  
This suggests that older adults have more difficulty than young adults representing text at 
the surface level. 
Stine and Wingfield (1990) demonstrated that there are age differences at the text-
based level.  They asked young and old adults to listen to a passage of text.  Older adults 
recalled less of the text.  For simpler texts, this was seen in terms of their inability to hold 
as much information in working memory as measured by the word span task.  Therefore, 
individuals with a lower working memory span were unable to hold as much information 
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from the text in working memory as individuals with a higher working memory span.  
This results in the inability to recall as much information and a decline in comprehension.   
Other studies have shown that while younger adults are superior at the text-based 
level, older adults perform better at the situation model level (Radvansky, Curiel, Zwaan, 
& Copeland, 2001).  In a study by Radvansky et al. (2001), influences of aging on 
different levels of representation were considered.  Participants were either instructed to 
summarize the material (summary group) or relate the material to historical knowledge 
(knowledge acquisition group).  The summary group represented comprehension at the 
text-based level, while the knowledge acquisition group represented comprehension at 
the situation model level.  After reading the text, participants were given a recognition 
test in which the probes were blocked by story, with the title appearing before the probes.  
Participants indicated whether a sentence had been read earlier by pressing the 
corresponding key.  Participants were warned that sentences might be similar in nature 
but contain some wording changes.  Four types of probes were used in the recognition 
test:  verbatim probes of the sentences that had appeared in the text, paraphrase probes 
that contain the same propositions but were expressed differently, inference probes that 
were not mentioned but were consistent with the described situation, and incorrect 
probes. The ability to discriminate between verbatim and paraphrase probes was an index 
of the surface representation.  The ability to discriminate between paraphrase and 
inference probes was an index of the text-based representation.  Finally, the ability to 
discriminate between inference and incorrect probes was an index of the use of situation 
models.  Results revealed that younger adults were superior at the text-based level.  
However, older adults were better than younger adults at the situation model level.  Older 
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adults relied on the use of situation models more than younger adults.  In a second 
experiment, when some participants were asked to take the recognition test one week 
following the reading, older adults still relied more on situation models and performed as 
well as younger adults at this level of comprehension.  Thus, there seem to be age 
differences in the preferred levels of representation of text.  Young adults rely more on 
what the text actually was, while older adults rely more on what the text was about.   
Other cognitive abilities play a role in comprehension.  During encoding of text, 
older adults make associations between relevant and irrelevant information, while during 
retrieval of text, older adults access more information than necessary.  The interference of 
irrelevant information at both encoding and retrieval could explain why older adults show 
a deficit in memory at the text-based level.  In a study by Van der Linden et al. (1999), 
the objective was to demonstrate the extent to which working memory deficits account 
for the age-related differences seen in comprehension by using structural equation 
modeling.  Participants were required to complete a battery of tests that measured 
working memory, interference, processing speed, and the ability to represent text at the 
text-based level.  Results suggested that the age-related differences at the text-based level 
were accounted for by a decline in working memory capacity and that this decline in 
capacity was a result of a reduction in processing speed and the inability to inhibit 
irrelevant information.   
 Although age differences in working memory affect comprehension, expertise on 
domain-relevant tasks may help older adults compensate for this age-related decline.  
Expertise allows the load on working memory capacity to be reduced, enabling experts to 
understand domain-relevant tasks better than nonexperts because more working memory 
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capacity will be available to interpret and update inferences made from the text.  Morrow, 
Leirer, and Altieri (1992) observed younger and older pilots and nonpilots ability to 
understand and recall domain-specific texts.  Participants read either aviation or general 
narratives.  Demands on working memory were manipulated by either facilitating (well-
organized text) or interfering with (poorly organized text) referent assignment.  
Following the target sentence, participants were asked to answer questions about the 
referent by writing down the character’s name.  After each narrative, participants were 
asked to recall the narrative.  Results demonstrated that expertise helped older adults 
update and recall situation models from narratives to the same extent as younger adults.  
Young and old pilots both used knowledge more than narrative cues to update the 
situation model.  However, working memory was needed more when target sentences 
were more difficult, resulting in the inability to use aviation knowledge.  This produced 
deficits in the older pilots’ ability to understand and recall the text.  In other words, only 
when older adults are able to access knowledge do the benefits of knowledge-based 
strategies offset age-related capacity declines that affect comprehension. 
Older adults are also able to remove information about a completed goal from 
their situation model as effectively as younger adults.  Radvansky and Curiel (1998) 
tested the ability of younger and older adults to select relevant information while 
updating their situation model.  Participants were required to read a narrative with either 
a failed goal, completed goal, or a neutral scenario.  In the failed goal narrative, the 
character was initially unable to successfully complete the goal.  Only later, was the goal 
accomplished.  In the completed goal narrative, the character was able to successfully 
accomplish the goal early in the story.  In the neutral narrative, the character did not set 
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out to accomplish a specific goal; instead, the narrative described a succession of events 
the character experienced.  Following each narrative, participants answered questions by 
identifying whether they were true or false.  Reaction times were measured, where a 
slower response indicated that the goal information was no longer available in their 
situation model.  Results revealed that both young and old adults responded more slowly 
to probes for the completed goal than for the failed goal.  In other words, neither group 
actively maintained information for the completed goal but both maintained information 
for a failed attempt at a goal.  However, reaction times to probes for neutral information 
were slower than reaction times to probes for completed goal information, indicating that 
completed goal information was more available for both groups than neutral information.  
Therefore, age was not a factor when updating goal information after story characters 
completed their goals.   
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Current Study 
 
Several studies have demonstrated that an intact PFC is crucial to efficiently 
perform working memory executive function tasks (Baddeley, 1992; Prabhakaran et al., 
1997; Waltz et al., 1999) and that working memory executive function is involved during 
causal reasoning (Fugelsang & Dunbar, 2005). PFC functioning declines with age 
(Hartman et al., 2001; Raz et al., 1998; Rypma & D’Esposito, 2000); and thus, the ability 
to perform working memory executive function tasks declines (Haut et al., 2000).  This 
decline in working memory executive function results in a decline in reasoning tasks, 
including causal reasoning (Fry & Hale, 1996; Kail, 2007; Waltz et al., 1999).  Studies 
have also demonstrated that an age-related decline in working memory executive 
function results in a reduction in memory for text and a decline in comprehension (Stine 
& Wingfield, 1990; Van der Linden et al., 1999).  Age differences have been found in the 
ability to represent text.  Younger adults are superior at recalling the actual words and 
sentences from text (Stine-Morrow et al., 2004) and abstract representations (Stine & 
Wingfield, 1990).  However, older adults perform just as well as young adults at 
determining the overall meaning and making inferences from the text (Radvansky et al., 
2001).  Additionally, age differences in working memory executive function affect older 
adults' ability to update causal information (Hartman et al., 2001). 
The goal of this research was to investigate whether there are age differences in 
updating causal information in text material.  Causal information from text material may 
originally be ambiguous or turn out to be inaccurate (Gerrig, 1993).  Research has 
demonstrated that young adult readers sometimes fail to update memory to include new 
causal information (Johnson & Seifert, 1994, 1998, 1999; Seifert & Patalano, 2001).  For 
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example, Johnson and Seifert (1994) asked participants to read a series of messages about 
the investigation of a warehouse fire.  Early in the messages, participants read about a 
possible cause of the fire (i.e., volatile materials stored in a closet).  Later in the 
messages, some participants read a correction of that information (i.e. the closet was 
actually empty).  Following the messages, participants completed a free recall test.  
Participants described the contents of the closet as a potential cause of the fire, whether 
they had read the revised or unrevised version of the messages.  This suggests that when 
later information contradicts earlier information, that earlier information remains 
available and influential in memory (Van Oostendorp & Bonebakker, 1999).  These 
results are not due to the readers ignoring the revisions (Otero & Kintsch, 1992; Seifert, 
2002; Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 1988).  In another experiment, Johnson and Seifert 
(1994) provided a plausible alternative cause of the fire.  Results showed that participants 
were affected less by the misinformation when a plausible alternative cause was 
provided.   
In the present study, older and younger adults were asked to read and comprehend 
text that included causal information about an event in the text.  They were required to 
update this causal information in their situation model of the text.  A series of messages 
about the investigation of a warehouse fire was presented to participants. A plausible 
causal explanation for the fire was given in one of the messages.  However, this was 
misinformation that was corrected in a later message.  In the correction statement, a 
memory cue to the misinformation was provided for some participants.  Participants were 
then given a memory test to observe whether this correction was incorporated into their 
situation model. 
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Participants' performance at the text-based level and situation model level was 
measured.  It was expected that older adults, like younger adults, would be able to 
generate the situation model for the text including the initial causal reason for the fire 
(Radvansky & Curiel, 1998; Radvansky et al., 2001; Stine & Wingfield, 1990).   
However, older adults should perform more poorly than younger adults when recalling 
information at the text-based level (Radvanksy et al., 2001; Stine & Wingfield, 1990).  In 
addition, it was expected that age-related decline in working memory executive function 
might produce differences in younger and older adults’ ability to update their knowledge 
of the causal information. Prior research suggests that when older adults have strong 
causal beliefs, they don’t update beliefs with new information (Mutter et al., 2007). 
Updating working memory with new causal information from a text requires efficient 
working memory executive function (Caplan & Waters, 1999; Daneman & Carpenter, 
1980; Norman et al., 1991; Radvansky & Curiel, 1998; Stine & Wingfield, 1990; Tun et 
al., 1991).  One must be able to retrieve and hold the old situation model in working 
memory, including the original causal relationship.  Also, one must be able to process 
new causal information in working memory, determine the plausibility of the causes, and 
then replace the old causal information with new information in the situation, if 
necessary.  Moreover, greater inhibitory processes may be required to suppress and 
replace an erroneous cause for an event.  Because these aspects of cognition are impaired 
in older adults (Radvansky & Curiel, 1998; Van der Linden et al., 1999), a decline in the 
situation model updating process was expected for older adults compared to younger 
adults.  In particular, older adults should have more references to words in the text from 
 20 
 
the corrected statement than younger adults because they experience difficulties when 
updating causal beliefs in working memory (Mutter et al., 2007).   
Prior work has suggested that memory cues provide older adults with sufficient 
information to recall prior information and integrate the new information into current 
working memory models (Hartman et al., 2001).  Older adults should therefore perform 
better during the updating process when memory cues to the correction statement are 
present than when memory cues to the correction statement were not provided.  This 
study investigated whether a direct cue to the prior misinformation benefited older 
participants during the updating process to a greater extent than an indirect cue to prior 
information.  It was expected that both age groups would recall more erroneous 
information when a direct cue to previous misinformation was provided within the 
correction statement than when no correction statement was provided and that both age 
groups would recall more erroneous information when an indirect cue to previous 
misinformation was provided within the correction statement than when a direct cue was 
provided.  It was also hypothesized that older adults would recall more erroneous 
information than young adults when a direct cue to previous misinformation was 
provided within the correction statement than when no correction statement was provided 
and would recall even more erroneous information than young adults when an indirect 
cue to previous misinformation was provided within the correction statement than when a 
direct cue was provided. 
Finally, this study investigated whether cognitive functioning is related to the 
ability to update and comprehend text.  Participants received a battery of tests that 
measured cognitive function.  Correlations between cognitive functioning and ability to 
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update text material were analyzed.  Table 1 contains the predicted correlations.  It was 
hypothesized that frontal lobe scores would be positively correlated with text-based 
scores for young adults but negatively correlated with text-based scores for older adults.  
There should be no correlation between these scores and the situation model scores for 
either young or older adults.  Temporal lobe scores should be positively correlated with 
text-based scores and situation model scores for young adults but negatively correlated 
with text-based scores and situation model scores for older adults.  Finally, it was 
expected that semantic knowledge scores would be negatively correlated with text-based 
scores for young adults and positively correlated with text-based scores for older adults, 
but there should be no correlation  between these scores and the situation model scores 
for either young or older adults. 
Table 1 
Correlations Between Cognitive Functioning and Ability to Update Text Material 
[Positive Correlation (+); Negative Correlation (-); No Correlation (0)] 
 Young Older 
Model 
Frontal 
Lobe 
Temporal 
Lobe 
Semantic 
Knowledge 
Frontal 
Lobe 
Temporal 
Lobe 
Semantic 
Knowledge 
Text-
Based 
+ + - - - + 
Situation  0 + 0 0 - 0 
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Method 
Participants 
 Forty-eight young (ages 18-30) and forty-eight older (age > 60) adults 
participated in this experiment.  Young adults were recruited from introductory 
psychology classes through the departmental study board and received course credit and a 
$5 monetary stipend for their participation.  Older adults were recruited from the 
community via mass mailings and advertisements and went through a screening process 
via the phone to ensure that they were capable of performing cognitive tasks and that any 
medications they were on would not interfere with cognitive processes. Older adults were 
paid a $25 monetary stipend for their participation.  Biographical data (age, race, gender, 
socioeconomic status, years of education, and marital status), as well as measures of basic 
health (e.g. heart disease, head injury, stroke, etc.) were collected for both groups.  
Participants who reported current use of medications known to affect cognitive ability or 
who suffered from any neurological or psychological impairment were excluded from the 
study. 
Design and Materials 
 A 2 (Age: Young vs. Older) x 3 (Condition: Mention Control, Direct Negation, 
Indirect Negation) factorial design was used.  The materials were a modified version of 
the series of messages from Wilkes and Leatherbarrow (1988) and Johnson and Seifert 
(1994).  Participants received fourteen messages, each 2-4 sentences long, about the 
investigation of a warehouse fire (see Appendix A).  Message 5 was a causal statement, 
indicating that volatile materials located in the closet were responsible for the fire.  In 
each condition, the way that participants receive a correction statement concerning the 
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volatile materials located in the closet was manipulated.  In the Direct Negation 
condition, the correction statement contained elements of the previous statement to 
provide a retrieval cue that helps participants retrieve the earlier information more easily.  
In the Indirect Negation condition no cue for the previous message was provided, forcing 
participants to retrieve the information from memory.  In the Mention Control condition, 
a correction statement did not appear within the series of messages.  Table 2 indicates 
how messages were combined to create the different conditions.  In the Mention Control, 
Direct Negation, and Indirect Negation conditions, Message 5 indicated that cans of oil 
paint and pressurized gas cylinders were present in a closet in the warehouse.  In the 
Direct Negation and Indirect Negation conditions, a correction to the misinformation in 
Message 5 appeared in Message 11.  In the Direct Negation condition, Message 11 
restated elements of Message 5 before indicating that the closet had been empty in order 
to provide a direct cue to remind about the earlier information.  For example, if a direct 
memory cue was provided for the misinformation it stated in a second message received 
from Police Investigator Lucas regarding the investigation into the fire that the closet 
reportedly containing cans of oil paint and gas cylinders had actually been empty before 
the fire.  In the Indirect Negation condition, Message 11 stated only that the earlier 
message had been incorrect and that the closet had been empty.  Therefore, if no direct 
memory cue was provided for the misinformation it stated in a second message received 
from Police Investigator Lucas regarding the investigation into the fire that the previous 
statement was incorrect, the closet had actually been empty.  Thus, in this condition, 
participants did not receive a direct cue for the previous message and they were required 
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to retrieve the information from memory.  In the Mention Control condition, Message 11 
only referred to firefighters having been released from the hospital. 
Table 2 
Content of Critical Messages by Group 
Group Message 5 Message 11 
Mention Control Volatile Materials Firefighters 
Indirect Negation Volatile Materials Empty closet 
No cue for previous 
message 
Direct Negation Volatile Materials Empty closet 
Cue for previous message 
 
Following the messages, a free recall test was administered in which participants 
were instructed to write down as accurately as possible their account about the event in 
question, including the cause of the fire (see Appendix B). Upon completion of the free 
recall test, participants were given a 30 minute retention interval, during which they 
completed a portion of the battery of tests assessing cognitive function (see Table 3).  
This battery included measures of frontal lobe integrity such as working memory 
executive function [i.e., Reading Span Test (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980)], perseverative 
responding [i.e., Modified Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Hart, Kwentus, Wade, & Taylor, 
1988)], and verbal fluency [i.e., Controlled Oral Word Association (Benton & Hamsher, 
1976)].  The battery also included measures of temporal lobe functioning such as 
incidental associative learning [i.e., WAIS-III Digit Symbol Incidental Learning 
(Wechsler, 1981)], episodic memory [i.e., WMS-R Logical Memory I (Wechsler, 1987)], 
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learning and schema formation [i.e., WMS-R Verbal Paired Associates I (Wechsler, 
1987)], and processing speed [i.e., WAIS-III Digit Symbol (Wechsler, 1981); Pattern 
Comparison (Salthouse & Babcock, 1991)].  Tests also included a measure of semantic 
knowledge [i.e., Mill Hill Vocabulary (Raven, 1998)]. 
Table 4 shows young and older adults’ average age, gender, and composite frontal 
lobe, temporal lobe, and semantic knowledge scores for each condition. The frontal lobe 
composite score was the average of the z-scores for Reading Span, WCST, Digit Symbol, 
Pattern Comparison, and FAS, the temporal lobe composite score was the average of z-
scores for Digit Symbol Incidental Learning, Logical Memory I, and Verbal Paired 
Associates, and the semantic knowledge composite score was the Mill Hill Vocabulary 
score. 
 26 
 
Table 3 
Tests of Cognitive Function 
Author Assessment Measures 
Hart, Kwentus, Wade, & 
Taylor, 1988 
Modified Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Task 
# of categories achieved 
Benton & Hamsher, 
1976 
Controlled Oral Word 
Association 
# of words; strategies 
Daneman & Carpenter, 
1980 
Reading Span Highest level achieved with 2 
correct responses 
Wechsler, 1981 WAIS-III Digit Symbol Total correct responses 
Salthouse & Babcock, 
1991 
Pattern Comparison Total correct responses 
Wechsler, 1981 WAIS-III Digit Symbol 
Incidental Learning 
Total correct responses 
 
Wechsler, 1987 WMS-R Verbal Paired 
Associates I 
Total correct pairings for first 
3 trials 
Wechsler, 1987 WMS-R Logical Memory I Total repeated items 
Raven, 1998 Mill Hill Vocabulary # of correct responses 
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Table 4 
Participant Characteristics  
 Young Adults Older Adults 
Characteristic 
Mention 
Control 
Direct 
Negation 
Indirect 
Negation 
Mention 
Control 
Direct 
Negation 
Indirect 
Negation 
Age 
    M 
    SD 
 
21.88 
2.55 
 
19.88 
1.26 
 
21.19 
2.90 
 
67.44 
5.48 
 
65.25 
4.86 
 
69.19 
7.71 
Gender 
    M 
    SD 
 
1.44 
0.51 
 
1.31 
0.48 
 
1.31 
0.48 
 
1.38 
0.50 
 
1.38 
0.50 
 
1.44 
0.51 
Frontal Lobe 
    M 
    SD 
 
103.69 
10.35 
 
98.19 
10.93 
 
105.81 
11.58 
 
97.81 
10.70 
 
96.25 
9.45 
 
99.25 
9.72 
Temporal Lobe 
    M 
    SD 
 
204.06 
18.81 
 
198.06 
18.30 
 
209.81 
21.70 
 
142.56 
30.21 
 
158.94 
19.77 
 
160.44 
28.23 
Semantic 
Knowledge 
    M 
 
29.94 
5.86 
 
32.38 
4.77 
 
33.88 
6.16 
 
34.81 
7.51 
 
36.50 
6.68 
 
36.00 
5.55 
 
 Following the retention interval, an open-ended questionnaire containing 
questions about the event was administered (see Appendix B).  This questionnaire 
included a total of 23 questions:  10 questions on facts directly presented in the messages, 
11 questions requiring the participants to make inferences about the event, and 2 
questions regarding their awareness of a correction or contradiction.  In a second session, 
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participants completed the remaining tests in the battery assessing cognitive function (see 
Table 3).   
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually in two sessions lasting approximately an 
hour and a half.  All testing was conducted in the Cognition Laboratory or similar 
experimental room.  Some tasks were completed on a Macintosh computer and some 
were completed using a pencil and paper.  Young and older adults completed the same 
procedure. 
Participants first completed an informed consent form and a demographic and 
health questionnaire.  They were also given an opportunity to ask questions or voice 
concerns at this time.  They then completed the experimental task and the battery of tests 
that assessed cognitive functioning.  The experimental task was run on a Macintosh 
computer.  Participants were instructed that we were interested in how people understand 
and remember reports and that a series of statements all related to one event would be 
presented on the computer screen, one message at a time.  Participants were also told that 
they would be asked to recall the information later.  They were told that pressing the 
spacebar would allow them to advance to the next message and that they would not be 
able to refer back to previous messages but that they could take as much time as they 
needed to read each message.  When all the messages were presented, the participants 
received the free recall test and were instructed to write down as accurately as possible 
their account of the event in question.  Following the free recall test, they were given a 
portion of the battery of tests assessing cognitive function to work on for 30 minutes.  All 
tests during this retention interval were timed to ensure that all participants received the 
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same duration.  To accommodate variability across subjects, participants did not begin a 
task if it would not be completed in the allotted time.  In such a case, participants 
completed these tasks at a later time.  Additionally, if participants completed the tasks in 
under 30 minutes, they were able to sit in the laboratory and take a short break until the 
retention interval had passed.  Afterwards, participants received the open-ended 
questionnaire and were instructed to answer each question on the basis of their 
understanding of the reports.  They were given as much time as they needed to complete 
this questionnaire.  Upon completion of the session, participants were debriefed and 
given the opportunity to ask questions about the study.  They were then compensated for 
time spent participating in the study.  In a second session scheduled on a separate day, the 
participants completed the remaining tests of cognitive function. 
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Results 
Scoring 
Two researchers, one of whom was unaware of the different conditions, scored 
the free recall and open-ended questionnaire.  Scores were first obtained separately by 
each researcher.  Then both researchers came together to discuss and come to a consensus 
on the final score received by the participant for each measure.  In most instances, it was 
not difficult to come to an agreement for the final score.  However, when a disagreement 
did exist, an additional researcher’s opinion was consulted to settle this difference.  Two 
text-based measures were scored.  Summary Recall from the free recall test was the total 
number of non-correction idea units recalled. The idea units were derived from Wilkes 
and Leatherbarrow (1988).  Only idea units common to all three conditions were included 
in this score.  An idea unit was considered recalled if the participant reported a 
recognizable portion of the idea unit.  Some of the idea units were long and difficult for 
participants to recall entirely.  However, receiving a lenient and strict score is a common 
technique in text comprehension research (Tan & Nicholson, 1997).  Participants stated 
half of the idea unit for a correct lenient response.  For example, one idea unit was 
“…and an intense heat that made the fire particularly difficult to bring under control.”  If 
the participant only recalled that there was a strong heat, a correct lenient response was 
recorded.  However, participants were required to recall more than half or the entire gist 
of the idea unit for a correct strict response.  Taking our example from above, if the 
participant stated that there was a strong heat that made it hard to control the fire, a 
correct strict response was recorded.  A higher lenient or strict score indicated that the 
participant was more capable of recalling information at the text-based level.  Fact Recall 
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was the percent correct recall of the fact questions from the open-ended questionnaire.  
Questions four and seven had answers that were long and difficult for participants to 
recall entirely.  Again, receiving a lenient and strict score is a common technique in text 
comprehension research; therefore, a lenient and strict score for this measure was 
received.  A correct lenient response for question four meant that the participant only 
stated one feature of the fire.  If the participant stated at least two features of the fire a 
correct strict response was recorded.  For question seven, a correct lenient response 
meant that the participant only stated one item in the storage room.  A correct strict 
response meant that the participant stated at least two items in the storage room.  Higher 
lenient and strict scores indicated an ability to recall information at the text-based level.    
Four situation model measures were scored:  Thematic Inference, Direct 
Reference, Global Cause, and Correction Recall. The Thematic Inference measure came 
from the eleven inference questions in the open-ended questionnaire.  For this measure, 
references to the key words from the discredited message (i.e. oil, paint, gas, cans, 
cylinders), mentioning the closet itself without indicating it was empty, or making 
attributions of carelessness or negligence were counted as inferences.  References to 
stored stationary at the warehouse or the structure of the building were not included as 
careless or negligent inferences. Higher scores in the Thematic Inference measure 
indicated less updating because on the inference questions participants had more 
references to the volatile materials.  The Direct Reference measure came from the free 
recall test and the fact and inference questions from the open-ended questionnaire.  Only 
references to the volatile materials themselves (i.e. oil, paint, cans, gas, cylinders) without 
indicating a correction later were counted.  High scores on the Direct Reference measure 
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indicated that the participant did not update their situation model because on the free 
recall, fact questions, and inference questions they had more references to the volatile 
materials without acknowledging that this was misinformation.  The Global Cause 
measure came from the free recall test and indicated whether participants referred to the 
volatile materials as the cause of the fire without mentioning the correction within the 
messages.   Therefore, this measure indicated difficulty in updating at the situation model 
level when an answer for the cause of the fire did not reference that the message had been 
corrected.  For the Correction Recall measure, an accurate reference to the correction in 
either the free recall test or the open-ended questionnaire was accepted and indicated the 
ability of the participant to update at the situation model level.  Alpha was set at 0.05 for 
all analyses of these measures. 
Text-Based Level 
The average number of idea units recalled from the summary recall is shown in 
Table 5.  Because only the messages common to all conditions (i.e. Mention Control, 
Direct Negation, Indirect Negation) were included in the Summary Recall measure, there 
should not be differences between the conditions (i.e. Mention Control, Direct Negation, 
Indirect Negation).  However, condition was included in the analyses to ensure that there 
was no difference for the three scenarios.  A 2 (Age: Young vs. Older) x 3 (Condition: 
Mention Control vs. Direct Negation vs. Indirect Negation) factorial ANOVA was 
conducted on the lenient Summary Recall measure to determine whether age and 
condition affected the number of idea units recalled.  A significant main effect of age was 
found, F(1, 90) = 12.98, p = .001, η2 = 0.13, showing that older adults recalled fewer idea 
units than young adults.  As expected, there was no significant main effect of condition, 
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F(2, 90) = 1.72, p = .19, η2 = 0.04, nor was there an interaction between age and 
condition, F(2, 90) = 0.98, p = .38, η2 = 0.02. 
A 2 (Age: Young vs. Older) x 3 (Condition: Mention Control vs. Direct Negation 
vs. Indirect Negation) factorial ANOVA was also conducted for the strict Summary 
Recall data.  A significant main effect of age was again observed, F(1, 90) = 9.56, p = 
.003, η2= 0.10, showing that older adults recalled fewer idea units than young adults.  
There was no significant main effect of condition, F(2,90) = 1.39,  p = 0.26, η2 = 0.03, 
nor was there was an interaction between age and condition, F(2, 90) = 0.50, p = 0.61, η2 
= 0.01. 
The average percent correct on the fact recall from the open-ended questionnaire 
is shown in Table 5.  A 2 (Age: Young vs. Older) x 3 (Condition: Mention Control vs. 
Direct Negation vs. Indirect Negation) factorial ANOVA was conducted for the lenient 
Fact Recall data to determine whether fact recall was affected by age and condition.  A 
significant main effect of age was found, F(1, 90) = 10.04, p = .002, η2 = 0.10.  Older 
adults recalled fewer fact questions than young adults.  There was not a significant main 
effect of condition, F(2, 90) = 0.69, p = 0.50, η2 = 0.02, and there was no interaction 
between age and condition, F(2, 90) = 1.62, p = 0.20, η2 = 0.04. 
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Table 5 
Number of Idea Units Recalled from Summary Recall & Percent Accurate on Fact Recall 
 Summary Recall Fact Recall 
Group Lenient Strict Lenient Strict 
Young     
    M 8.58 5.67 5.38 4.44 
    SD 4.84 3.56 1.83 1.89 
Older     
    M 5.56 3.71 4.25 3.25 
    SD 3.29 2.56 1.66 1.45 
 
 
Analyses for the strict scoring method produced similar results.  A 2 (Age: Young 
vs. Older) x 3 (Condition: Mention Control vs. Direct Negation vs. Indirect Negation) 
factorial ANOVA showed a significant main effect of age, F(1, 90) = 12.05, p = .001, η2 
= 0.12, with older adults recalling fewer fact questions than young adults.  There was not 
a significant main effect of condition, F(2, 90) = 1.01, p = 0.37, η2 = 0.02, nor was there 
an interaction between age and condition, F(2, 90) = 1.48, p = 0.23, η2 = 0.03. 
Situation Model Level 
The average number of inferences for the volatile materials in each group is 
shown in Table 6.  Analyses for these data answered the question of whether age and 
condition affected the number of references to volatile materials, the closet itself, or 
attributions to carelessness/negligence.  A 2 (Age: Young vs. Older) x 3 (Condition: 
Mention Control vs. Direct Negation vs. Indirect Negation) factorial ANOVA was 
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conducted on the Thematic Inference scores.  There was not a significant main effect of 
age, F(1, 90) = 1.25, p = 0.27, η2 = 0.01, indicating that there was no difference between 
young and older participants in the overall number of references to volatile materials, the 
closet itself, or attributions to carelessness/negligence.  There was not a significant main 
effect of condition (e.g. Mention Control vs. Direct Negation vs. Indirect Negation), F(2, 
90) = 0.33, p = 0.72, η2 = 0.01, indicating that there was not a difference in the number of  
references to volatile materials, the closet itself, or attributions to carelessness/negligence 
between the three conditions.  Finally, there was not a significant interaction between age 
and condition, F(2, 90) = 0.98, p = 0.38, η2 = 0.02, indicating that differences in the 
number of references to volatile materials, the closet itself, or attributions to 
carelessness/negligence did not vary for the six age by condition groups.  
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Table 6 
Average Number of References and Inferences to Volatile Materials for Each Group 
 Young Old 
Condition 
Thematic 
Inference 
Direct   
Reference 
Thematic 
Inference 
Direct   
Reference 
Mention Control 
    M 
    SD 
 
8.13 
3.50 
 
9.56 
5.57 
 
7.31 
4.83 
 
7.94 
5.66 
Indirect Negation 
    M 
    SD 
 
5.88 
2.47 
 
5.69 
3.75 
 
7.75 
6.20 
 
7.69 
7.21 
Direct Negation 
    M 
    SD 
 
6.44 
4.07 
 
5.75 
3.32 
 
8.56 
5.78 
 
8.31 
5.45 
 
To ensure that these results were not due to the similar means for the Indirect and 
Direct Negation conditions, the data for the two Negation conditions were collapsed and 
these Thematic Inference scores were entered into a 2 (Age: Young vs. Older) x 2 
(Condition: Mention Control vs. Negation) factorial ANOVA.  There were again no 
significant main effects of age, F(1, 90) = 0.35, p = 0.55, η2 = 0.00, or condition, F(1, 90) 
= .32, p = 0.58, η2 = 0.00, nor was there a significant interaction between age and 
condition, F(1, 90) = 1.98, p = 0.16, η2 = 0.02.  The results for the Thematic Inference 
scores were not due to the similar means in the Negation conditions. 
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 The average number of Direct References to volatile materials in each group is 
shown in Table 6.  Analyses were run on the Direct Reference scores to determine 
whether age and condition affected the number of references to the volatile materials.  A 
2 (Age: Young vs. Older) x 3 (Condition: Mention Control vs. Direct Negation vs. 
Indirect Negation) factorial ANOVA was conducted.  There was not a significant main 
effect of age, F(1, 90) = 0.81, p = 0.37, η2 = 0.01, nor was there a significant main effect 
of condition, F(2, 90) = 1.38,  p = 0.26, η2 = 0.03, or a significant interaction between age 
and condition indicating that the number of references to the volatile materials was not 
affected by condition, F(2, 90) = 1.46, p = 0.24, η2 = 0.03.    
The Direct References scores for the two Negation conditions were again 
collapsed to ensure that the results were not affected by the similar means of the Indirect 
and Direct Negation conditions. A 2 (Age: Young vs. Older) x 2 (Condition: Mention 
Control vs. Negation) factorial ANOVA produced no significant main effect of age, F(1, 
90) = 0.08, p = 0.77, η2 = 0.00.  There was a marginal effect of condition, F(1, 90) = 2.75, 
p = 0.10, η2 = 0.03, and a marginal interaction between age and condition, F(1, 90) = 
2.94, p = 0.09, η2 = 0.03. These effects provide some evidence that the number of 
references to volatile materials was affected by the combination of age and condition.  
Specifically, young adults made fewer references to volatile materials when a correction 
to the misinformation was provided. However, older adults had almost the same number 
of references to volatile materials in the Negation conditions.  This suggests that young 
adults were somewhat better at updating their situation model in the Negation conditions.  
Analysis of the Global Cause measure for older adults indicated that 37.50% 
made attributions to flammables as the cause of the fire in the Mention Control condition, 
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6.25% made attributions to the flammables as the cause of the fire in the Direct Negation 
condition, and 12.50% made attributions to the flammables as the cause of the fire in the 
Indirect Negation condition. The likelihood of attributing the cause of the fire to 
flammables in the three conditions was marginally different, χ2(2, N = 48) = 5.74, p = 
.06, indicating that older adults were somewhat more likely to attribute the cause to 
flammables in the Mention Control condition than in the Negation conditions.  For young 
adults, 50% made attributions to flammables as the cause of the fire in the Mention 
Control condition, 0% made attributions to the flammables as the cause of the fire in the 
Direct Negation condition, and 12.50% made attributions to the flammables as the cause 
of the fire in the Indirect Negation condition.  The difference between these conditions 
was significant, χ2(2, N = 48) = 13.14, p = .001, showing that young adults were more 
likely to attribute the cause to flammables in the Mention Control condition than in the 
Negation conditions. 
The Correction Recall measure showed that 100% of older adults did not recall 
the correction in the Mention Control condition, 18.75% of older adults did not recall the 
correction in the Direct Negation condition, and 37.50% of older adults did not recall the 
correction in the Indirect Negation condition.  The difference between these conditions 
was significant, χ2(2, N = 48) = 23.21, p = .001.  This suggests that older adults were 
more likely to provide a correction in the Negation conditions than in the Mention 
Control condition.  No young adults recalled a correction in the Mention Control 
condition and 25% did not recall the correction in each of the two Negation conditions.  
The difference between these conditions was significant, χ2(2, N = 48) = 24.00, p = .001. 
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This suggests that young adults were more likely to provide a correction in the Negation 
conditions than in the Mention Control condition. 
Correlational Analyses 
Composite scores for frontal and temporal lobe integrity and semantic knowledge 
and the text-based, and situation model measures were obtained for young and older 
adults. All composite scores were obtained separately for young and older adults. For the 
frontal lobe measure, Reading Span, WCST, Digit Symbol, Pattern Comparison, and FAS 
scores were converted into z-scores and the average of these z-scores was computed.  For 
the temporal lobe measure, Digit Symbol Incidental Learning, Logical Memory, and 
Verbal Paired Associates were converted into z-scores and the average of the z-scores 
was computed.  The semantic knowledge score was the Mill Hill Vocabulary score.  The 
text-based composite score came from the lenient Summary Recall and lenient Fact 
Recall measures.  Lenient Summary Recall and Fact Recall were converted into z-scores 
and averaged to produce the text-based composite score.  Finally, the situation model 
score came from the Direct Reference measure. Only the Direct and Indirect Negation 
conditions were included.  The Mention Control Condition was not included because it 
did not require a revision in belief.  The Direct Reference scores were converted into z-
scores. Correlations between the composite scores for frontal and temporal lobe integrity, 
semantic knowledge, and the text-based and situation model measures are shown in Table 
7. 
There was not a significant correlation between frontal lobe integrity and text-
based measures or between frontal lobe integrity and situation model measures for either 
age group.  Temporal lobe integrity was positively related to the text-based measures for 
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older adults, but not for young adults.  This indicates that as older adults’ temporal lobe 
scores increased, there was an increase in their text-based scores. There was not a 
significant correlation for temporal lobe integrity and situation model measures for either 
young or older adults. Semantic knowledge was positively correlated with text-based 
measures for young adults, but there was not a correlation between semantic knowledge 
scores and text-based measures for older adults.  This indicates that for young adults 
when there was an increase in the semantic knowledge scores, there was an increase in 
the text-based scores. Finally, semantic knowledge was positively correlated to situation 
model measures for older adults, but not for young adults.  As older adults’ semantic 
knowledge scores increased their situation model scores increased.   
 
Table 7 
Correlations between Composite Scores for Cognitive Ability and Comprehension  
 Young Adults Older Adults 
Measure 
Frontal 
Lobe 
Temporal 
Lobe 
Semantic 
Knowledge 
Frontal 
Lobe 
Temporal 
Lobe 
Semantic 
Knowledge 
Text-Based 
    r 
    p-value 
 
0.21 
0.24 
 
0.18 
0.32 
 
0.41 
0.02 
 
0.21 
0.25 
 
0.41 
0.02 
 
0.20 
0.26 
Situation 
Model 
    r 
    p-value 
 
 
-0.02 
0.91 
 
 
0.03 
0.89 
 
 
0.08 
0.68 
 
 
-0.02 
0.93 
 
 
0.06 
0.76 
 
 
0.45 
0.01 
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Discussion 
The goal of the present research was to investigate whether there were age 
differences in updating causal information in text material.  The hypotheses were that 
older adults would recall fewer idea units than young adults at the text-based level.  At 
the situation model level it was hypothesized that for both young and older adults, a 
direct cue (Direct Negation condition) to causal misinformation presented prior to the 
correction would facilitate updating more than an indirect cue (Indirect Negation 
condition) to the misinformation. It was further hypothesized that age differences would 
exist when updating causal information at the situation model level.  Specifically, older 
adults would not update their situation model as effectively as young adults in either of 
the Negation conditions.   
As expected, older adults’ performance was worse than younger adults’ 
performance at the text-based level.  For example, both strict and lenient scores in the 
Summary Recall measure showed that older adults recalled fewer idea units than young 
adults.  Also, older adults got fewer questions correct in the Fact Recall measure for strict 
and lenient scores.  This provided evidence that age differences exist when recalling 
information at the text-based level.  The data for the situation model level provided 
mixed results. There were no differences between the Mention Control, Direct Negation, 
and Indirect Negation for the Thematic Inference measure, suggesting that neither young 
nor older adults updated their causal beliefs when a direct or indirect cue to 
misinformation was provided.  Even after collapsing over the Direct Negation and 
Indirect Negation conditions due to their similar means, there were no overall age 
differences, differences between the Mention Control and Negation conditions, or 
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interaction between age and condition in the Thematic Inference measure.  In contrast, 
the Global Cause and Correction Recall measures showed that both young and older 
adults were less likely to attribute the cause of the fire to flammables and were more 
likely to provide a correction in the Negation conditions than in the Mention Control 
condition.   While these findings did not provide support for the hypothesis that the type 
of cue provided would make a difference during updating, they did provide some support 
for the hypothesis that young and older adults update their situation model in the 
Negation conditions.   
Finally, when the Direct Reference measure was collapsed over the Direct 
Negation and Indirect Negation conditions, a marginal effect of condition and a marginal 
age by condition interaction was observed. Young adults made fewer references to 
volatile materials when a correction to the misinformation was provided, suggesting that 
they updated their situation model in the Negation condition.  In contrast, older adults had 
almost the same number of references to volatile materials in the Negation condition as in 
the Mention Control condition, suggesting that they were less likely to update their causal 
model in the Negation condition.  This finding offers some support for the hypothesis that 
older adults do not update their situation model as effectively as young adults.    
The correlational analysis showed that frontal lobe composite scores were not 
related to the text-based measures for either young or older adults.  However, for older 
adults the lower the temporal lobe score, the lower the text-based score, suggesting that 
the decline seen in temporal lobe functioning due to aging may have played a role in the 
poorer performance seen in older adults on the text-based measures.  Neither the frontal 
nor temporal lobe composite scores were correlated with the situation model measures for 
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young or older adults.  However, for older adults the lower the semantic knowledge 
score, the lower the situation model score, suggesting that older adults’ semantic 
knowledge influenced their situation model score.  Furthermore, for young adults the 
higher the semantic knowledge score, the higher they scored on the text-based measures, 
suggesting that the young adults’ semantic knowledge contributed to their text-based 
score.  
In summary, older adults did not perform as well as young adults at the text-based 
level.  Furthermore, the findings suggest that young and older adults do update their 
situation model with causal information.  Although the Thematic Inference measure 
suggested that there was no updating, the Global Cause, Correction Recall, and Direct 
Reference measures all suggested that young and older adults were capable of updating 
causal information in their situation model. The hypothesis that older adults would not 
update their situation model as effectively as young adults received less support.  Finally, 
the results did not support the hypothesis that a direct cue to prior misinformation would 
facilitate more updating for young and older adults than an indirect cue to prior 
misinformation.  It appeared that the type of cue (i.e. Direct Negation vs. Indirect 
Negation) did not affect whether the situation model was updated. 
Text-Based Level 
This research showed that age had a small effect on ability to recall text at the 
text-based level; older adults recalled fewer idea units and answered more fact questions 
incorrectly than young adults. This finding is consistent with prior studies showing that 
young adults are superior to older adults at recalling text at the text-based level 
(Radvansky et al., 2001). For example, in a study by Radvansky et al. (2001) participants 
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read passages and either summarized the material (summary group) or related it to 
historical knowledge (knowledge acquisition group).  The summary group represented 
comprehension at the text-based level, while the knowledge acquisition group 
represented comprehension at the situation model level.  Following the reading, 
participants were given a recognition test where the sentence provided could be verbatim 
(surface level), paraphrased (text-based level), an inference (situation model level), or 
incorrect.  Young adults performed better at the surface level and text-based level, while 
older adults were better at the situation model level.  Furthermore, Stine and Wingfield 
(1990) showed that older adults recalled less of the text than young adults.  This was 
explained in terms of their low working memory span, which produces declines in 
comprehension and recall.  The current study, however, did not support that older adults 
recalled less of the text than young adults due to the shrinkage of the prefrontal cortex 
and corresponding decline in working memory. 
Instead, the correlational analysis in the present research showed that the temporal 
lobe composite score had a medium effect on text-based measures for older adults. The 
temporal lobe is involved in episodic memory (Preston & Wagner, 2007), memory of a 
specific time and/or place. Logical Memory I (Wechsler, 1987) measured episodic 
memory.  The participant listened to a paragraph read by the researcher.  Following the 
reading, the participant was asked to retell the paragraph as close to how it was read to 
them as possible.  Likewise, the text-based measures in the current study required the 
participant to recall idea units and answer fact questions.  In order to correctly identify an 
idea unit, the participant needed to remember the correct time and location of that 
episode.  Furthermore, the fact questions asked the participant to recall specific times and 
 45 
 
locations. Thus, episodic memory is needed to recall text at the text-based level (Weaver 
& Kintsch, 1996).  The decline in episodic memory seen in older adults (Head, Rodrigue, 
Kennedy, & Raz, 2008) may be related to changes in temporal lobe function (Zacks & 
Hasher, 2006).  Likewise, age-related changes in temporal lobe functioning resulting in 
declines in episodic memory may explain the correlation between the temporal lobe 
composite score and episodic text-based measures for older adults.  
Situation Model Level 
Johnson and Seifert (1994) found that young adults had problems updating causal 
inferences when misinformation was corrected.  However, in the current study, three of 
the situational model measures (Global Cause, Correction Recall, and Direct Reference) 
showed that young and older adults did update their situation model. For example, both 
the Global Cause and Correction Recall measures showed that young and older adults 
were less likely to attribute the cause of the fire to flammables and were more likely to 
report a correction in the Direct and Indirect Negation conditions than in the Mention 
Control condition.  Therefore, consistent with Hartman et al. (2001), the mere presence of 
a cue does help young and older adults update their situation model.  After collapsing the 
Direct and Indirect Negation conditions for the Direct Reference measure, a marginal 
effect of condition and a marginal interaction was found between age and condition. 
Young adults referenced the volatile materials less, indicating that updating was taking 
place.  Older adults referenced the same number of volatile materials in the Mention 
Control condition and Negation Condition.  This suggested that older adults did not 
update as much as young adults and provides some support for the hypothesis that older 
adults would not update their situation model as effectively as young adults. However, 
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there were no differences between the Mention Control, Direct Negation, and Indirect 
Negation conditions for young and older adults for the Thematic Inference measure. 
Furthermore, no age differences where found when referencing volatile materials, the 
closet itself, or attributions to carelessness/negligence. A significant effect may not have 
been seen because the power to observe an effect for this analysis was only .2 or less.  
Although this analysis may have lacked power, a trend in the correct direction can be 
seen in the data.  This measure may have been less sensitive than the other situational 
model measures (Global Cause, Correction Recall, and Direct Reference) and additional 
participants may be needed to see a significant effect in the analysis of this measure. 
However, these findings do not call into question prior findings (Radvansky et al., 2001) 
that older adults can update their situation models.   
It should be noted that half of the young adults in the Mention Control condition 
did not attribute the cause of the fire to flammables and 62.50% of older adults in this 
condition also did not attribute the cause of the fire to flammables.  In fact, in many 
instances older adults even mentioned that the cause of the fire was due to an electrical 
problem.  Message four suggested that the fire could have occurred from electrical 
problems.  Participants apparently knew that volatile materials were there but recognized 
that the real reason behind the cause of the fire was the electrical short.  If many young 
and older participants never thought the volatile materials were the cause of the fire in the 
first place, this would have reduced any potential differences between young and older 
adults in the situation model.  Future research should consider eliminating the electrical 
short from the message in order to reduce unintentional inferences about the cause of the 
fire.   
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Consistent with prior findings (Radvansky et al., 2001; Radvansky & Curiel, 
1998), the frontal lobe composite score did not correlate with the situation model scores 
for either the young or older adults, suggesting that the situation model was not related to 
working memory executive function.  The temporal lobe composite score and situation 
model scores were unrelated for both young and older adults.  This is not surprising 
because as mentioned above the temporal lobe is most important for episodic memory.  
Inconsistent with prior findings (Cosentino, Chute, Libon, Moore, & Grossman, 2006), 
the semantic knowledge composite score and situation model scores were not correlated 
for young adults.  Consistent with prior findings (Cosentino et al., 2006), the semantic 
knowledge composite score and situation model scores were correlated for older adults.  
Older adults’ better vocabulary may enable them to make better inferences and form their 
situation model.   
In conclusion, age differences were found at the text-based level; young adults are 
superior to older adults.  It appears that older adults’ decline in performance at the text-
based level might be related to decreased episodic memory which is a result of the 
decline seen in temporal lobe functioning as one ages.  Furthermore, the present research 
showed that both young and older adults do update causal information in situation 
models.  Although there does not seem to be much difference in this effect as a function 
of the type of cue, the findings did suggest that the presence of a cue led to updating.  
Relatively minor age differences in updating causal information in the situation model 
were found.  Finally, the situation model does not appear to be related to working 
memory.  However, older adults seem to use their semantic knowledge to help form their 
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situation model, while young adults use their semantic knowledge at the text-based level 
to help encode and recall text.   
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APPENDIX A 
     Message 1 
Jan. 25th 8:58 p.m. Alarm call received from premises of a wholesale stationery 
warehouse.  Premises consist of offices, a display room, and a storage room. 
     Message 2 
A serious fire was reported in the storage room, already out of control and 
requiring instant response.  Fire engine dispatched at 9:00 p.m. 
     Message 3  
The alarm was raised by the night security guard, who had smelled smoke and 
gone to investigate. 
     Message 4 
Jan. 26th 4:00 a.m.  Attending fire captain suggests that the fire was started by a 
short circuit in the wiring of a closet off the main storage room.  Police now 
investigating. 
     Message 5  
4:30 a.m. Message received from Police Investigator Lucas saying that they have 
reports that flammable materials, including cans of oil paint and pressurized gas 
cylinders, had been stored in the closet before the fire. 
     Message 6  
Firefighters attending the scene report thick, oily smoke and sheets of flames 
hampering their efforts, and an intense heat that made the fire particularly difficult 
to bring under control. 
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     Message 7 
It has been learned that a number of explosions occurred during the blaze, which 
endangered firefighters in the vicinity.  No fatalities were reported. 
     Message 8 
Two firefighters are reported to have been taken to the hospital as a result of 
breathing toxic fumes that built up in the area in which they were working. 
     Message 9 
A small fire had been discovered at the same warehouse six months previously.  It 
had been successfully extinguished by the workers themselves. 
     Message 10 
10:00 a.m. The owner of the affected warehouse estimates that total damage will 
amount to hundreds of thousands of dollars, although the premises were insured. 
     Message 11a (Mention Control) 
10:40 a.m. A second message received from Police Investigator Lucas regarding 
the investigation into the fire.  It stated that the two firefighters taken to the 
hospital had been released. 
     Message 11b (Direct Negation) 
10:40 a.m. A second message received from Police Investigator Lucas regarding 
the investigation into the fire.  It stated there were no cans of oil paint or gas 
cylinders in the closet that had reportedly contained them. The closet had been 
empty before the fire. 
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     Message 11c (Indirect Negation) 
10:40 a.m.  A second message received from Police Investigator Lucas regarding 
the investigation into the fire.  It stated that the earlier message was incorrect.   
The closet had actually been empty before the fire. 
     Message 12  
11:00 a.m.  The shipping supervisor has disclosed that the storage room contained 
bales of paper; mailing and legal-size envelopes; scissors, pencils, and other 
school supplies; and a large number of photocopying machines. 
     Message 13  
The display room was reported to contain display cases, catalogs, and the sales 
staffs’ desks.  It was only staffed from 11 a.m. to 2 p.m. due to declining sales. 
     Message 14 
11:30 a.m. Attending fire captain reports that the fire is now out and that the 
storage room has been completely gutted. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Free Recall Instructions 
 
Now, we would like you to write down, as accurately as possible, your account of what is 
known about the event in question, including the cause of the fire. 
Fact Questions 
1.  What was the extent of the warehouse’s premises? 
2.  Where did the attending fire captain think the fire started? 
3.  Where on the premises was the fire located? 
4.  What features of the fire were noted by the security guard? 
5.  What business was the firm in? 
6.  When was the fire engine dispatched? 
7.  What was in the storage room? 
8.  What was the cost of the damage done? 
9.  How was it thought the fire started? 
10.  When was the fire eventually put out? 
Inference Questions 
1.  Why did the fire spread so quickly? 
2.  For what reason might an insurance claim be refused? 
3.  What was the possible cause of the toxic fumes? 
4.  What was the relevance of the closet? 
5.  What aspect of the fire might the police want to continue investigating? 
6.  Why do you think the fire was particularly intense? 
7.  What is the most likely cause of the fire that the workers successfully put out earlier? 
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8.  What could have caused the explosions? 
9.  Where was the probable location of the explosions? 
10.  Is there any evidence of careless management? 
11.  How might the owner of the warehouse feel about the fire?  
Manipulation Check Questions 
1.  What was the point of the second message from the police? 
2.  Were you aware of any corrections in the reports that you read? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
